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A cynic once said that economic forecasting is neither an art nor a 
science -- it is a hazard. The present time is a good example of what he 
meant. ~1ost forecasters are now lowering their predictions of real economic 
growth for 1985 and 1986. This shift corres soon after a period in which 
economists were raising their projections of growth for the American economy. 
Not too surprisingly, all this has not exactly inspired public confidence in 
the abili~ of economists to make reliable forecasts. The harsh reality is 
that economists are not good at estimating the economy's performance for very 
short time periods, such as the next month or quarter. However, the record 
for forecasts of year-to-year changes is much better. 
For example, each month a group of 50 professional economic forecasters 
provides a consensus estimate for the year ahead. The result is called Blue 
Chip Economic Indicators. The forecast made by the panel in October of each 
year is especially important, because that month is the typical starting point 
for the annual company planning cycle. 
Over the past eight years, the Blue Chip panel's October estimates of 
real growth for the next year have turned out to be within 1.2 percentage 
points of the actual figure. The record on inflation is about the same, with 
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the Blue Chip panel averaging within 1.1 percentage points. That record will 
not qualify for the Guinness Book of vJorld Records, but it suggests why 
government and business executives continue to rely on economic forecasts. 
When we step back from the details of econometric models, we can spot 
some basic trends. Virtually all forecasters are now singing a variation of 
the same song: 1985 and 1986 are not going to be nearly as good as 1984. But 
the economy will continue to grow, by · between 2 and 3 percent. That compares 
to a 1 mo s t 7 percent 1 as t year. 
The basic reason for the slowdown is that domestic production is much 
weaker than domestic consumption. The difference, of course, is due to the 
rising tide of imports. For a while, consumer credit can finance the gap 
between income earned and money spent. But most people's spending ultimately 
reflects their income. Thus, the more modest pace of domestic production and 
income generation is slowing down the purchases of American ~onsumers. 
As usual~ there is a range of viewpoints among professional forecasters. 
The optimists see the GNP accelerating in 1986, as the economy gets its second 
wind. The pessimists expect the next recession to start some ti01e in the 
coming 12 months. Personally, I am in the middle of the road. 
I do not now see the seeds of the next recession. They may be there, but 
their sprouts are not yet visible to the naked eye. The usual factors· that 
precede a recession are not present. Consumer sentiment, judged by the 
standard surveys, remains high. Significant excess capacity exists in 
American industry; in fact business investment continues at a high level. 
Inventories are balanced with sales. Interest rates are not rising; rather it 
is the money supply that is rising at a rapid clip. There is not much oomph 
in the economy, but there is nothing seriously pushing it down. 
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By 1986, however, the recovery will be four years old; that is rather 
mature when we consider past business cycles. It is not, however, an adequate 
reason for projecting the end of the expansion in the economy. It is an 
occasion for sounding a note of caution. The recovery is at the stage where 
it is susceptible to all sorts of negative influences that could lead to a 
down turn, but I do not now see the onset of recession. 
Real GNP 
I nfl a ti on 
Unemployment 
HIGHLIGHTS OF ECONOMIC FORECAST 
1985 
+2.4% 
+3.7% 
7.2% 
Inflationary Expectations 
1986 
+3.0% 
+4.2% 
7.0% 
\~i th the i nfl a ti on rate hovering be tween 3 and 4 percent, it seems that 
the alarmists who have been forecasting an early return to escalating if not 
double digit inflation were wrong. Surely, the specific forecasts for 
high and rising inflation rates in 1984 and 1985 were off the board. 
Nevertheless, I harbor a growing suspicion that the main error of some 
monetarists and other inflation alarmists was in timing. They forgot how long 
it took to build up the inflationary pressures of the late 1970s. On the 
other hand, perhaps too many of us have quickly forgotten how painful it was, 
as measured by high unemployment rates, to bring inflation down to current 
levels. 
What concerns the monetarists is the extremely rapid rate of growth in the 
various monetary aggregates. M1 --the most widely watched monetary 
indicator-- has been rising at a 13 percent annual rate since early this 
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year. More specialized measures have also been expanding at a rapid rate. 
For example, the monetary base (a key ingredient in future money supply 
movements} has been expanding at a 9 percent rate since early in the year. 
More sanguine observers point to technical shifts, such as changes in the 
composition of deposits, to explain away the apparently excessive expansion of 
the rro ney sup p 1 y • 
I believe that the monetarists are crying wolf again. What concerns me, 
however, is the way the fable ends. Eventually, the little boy was right. And 
some straws in the wind are worrisome. 
\·Jhat cannot be readily explained away is the rise in measured inflationary 
expectations. According to one recent survey, financial decision-makers 
anticipate that the inflation rate over the coming five years will be about 
5 1/2 percent a year. That is 170 basis points higher than the current 
inflation rate. 
According to some observers, today•s economic policy environment is 
reminiscent of 1967, 1972, and 1977. These were the periods prior to the 
outbursts of rapid inflation in the fairly recent past. History does not have 
to repeat itself, but the current attitude toward inflation may be too 
sanguine. 
The International Outlook 
Let us take a few minutes to examine the foreign trade situation. The 
fact is that the United States is running a triple digit trade deficit. 
Meanwhile, Congress is searching for villains. 
Let's face it. If Congress restricts imports, that raises the danyer of 
retaliation against our exports. We do not have to guess about the 
consequences or remember as far back as the Smoot Hawley tariff of the 1930s. 
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Recent experience with China provides a good example. When we imposed quotas 
on their textile exports to us, they promptly reduced their agricultural and 
chemical imports from us. The U.S. textile industry got the benefits, while 
our fdrmers and our chemical companies and their employees bore the costs. 
A significant decline in the exchange rate of the dollar would be a far 
better solution to our international trade problems than any of the 
protectionist approaches. The 40 percent rise in the dollar since 1980 means 
a 40 percent price increase for U.S. firms competing against foreign goods. 
But that, in turn, gets us to our own budget deficit, which is at the heart of 
the superstrong dollar. And that has strictly a made-in-America label. 
The Fi sea 1 1986 Budget 
Looking at the Washington scene, the annual buciget debate has become a 
sad spectacle. He all know what has to be done. It is not a question of 
bringing an outlandish $·200 billion deficit down to merely an outrageous $180 
billion or a bloated $150 billion annual level. It is a matter of restoring 
our country•s finances to a semblance of balance. 
To those who say that economic growth will cure our fiscal problems, I 
respond that the next recession -- which we can neither pinpoint nor rule 
out-- will push the budget deficit to a new peak. History argues for a"t 
least one more recession in the 1980s. It will only take an average downturn 
to accelerate government spending and slow down revenue sufficiently to 
produce a deficit of $250 billion a year or more. 
Washington•s favorite parlor game is still spin-the-budget. But it now has 
a new name, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment to the bill to raise the debt 
limit to $2 trillion. That amendment requires Congress and the President to 
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reduce the deficit progressively until it is eliminated in fiscal 1991. This 
provision has been subjected to all sorts of criticism, some quite valid. But 
the fact remains that the Gramm approach is now the only legislative game in 
town to eliminate the deficit. The -amendment reflects widespreaa exasperation 
with the status quo. It surely is a challenge to the Congress and the ~Jhite 
House to do a better job of bringing spending into line with revenues. 
At first blush, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings bill seems to be an abdication 
of the Congressional budget function to the President. After all, if they 
don•t cut enough, he has to do it. But, on reflection, the potential is more 
serious than that. The bill would let Congress do the popular thing-- enact 
generous appropriations-~ while giving the President the onerous task of 
cutting spending or proposing tax increases. 
In any event, we must remember that the meter is running. Interest 
payments are mounting steadily. Delay means choosing in the future between 
even larger spending cuts and more unpopular tax increases. The best way to 
reduce the deficit-- and to lay the foundation for responsible tax reform in 
the years ahead-- is to carry through that necessary pruning of federal 
spending programs. The key to reducing federal spending is simple but not 
easy. It is the ability to say no. 
Tax Reform 
Meanwhile, for most of 1985 politicians in both parties have been busy 
diverting attention from the difficult question of cutting the deficit by 
focusing on tax reform. It is discouraging to hear the representatives of both 
political parties on this subject. If you listen to Democratic spokesmen, you 
quickly learn that they are embracing tax reform in the hope that, in the 
voters• eyes, such action will return the party to the nation•s mainstream. 
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But the Republicans are not any better on that score. They tell us that 
the beauty of their current tax reform plan is that it will help to attract 
blue collar families to the Republican party. The problems facing our nation 
deserve more serious responses than such exercises in cheap (or perhaps 
expensive) politics. 
When we push aside the labels attached to any of the proposed 11 reforms 11 of 
the federal tax structure-- be they Rostenkowski 1 S approach, Kemp-Kasten, 
Bradley-Gephardt, the November Treasury proposal, or the current Hhite House 
recommendations --we find that they are all variations of the same theme: 
reduce federal income taxes paid by American families and individuals and 
offset the revenue loss by raising taxes on business. 
Most of those 11 loophole 11 closers boil down to increasing taxes on 
business, mainly by reducing incentives to investment. What this means is that 
the proposed tax reform will not really be economically neutral. By 
discouraging inves·tment the proposed tax changes would depress the economy, 
preventing the achievement of revenue neutrality. It also means a higher 
budget deficit. 
It is ironic that policymakers in Washington are seriously considering 
such tax changes just as the growth rate is slowing down. Moreover, many of 
the industries hard hit by imports would be precisely those faced with the 
largest tax increases. Why worry about the problems of meeting foreign 
competition? Businesses don•t vote. 
My sense of irony is further aroused by the fact that the investment 
incentives adopted in 1981, which were then hailed as tax reform, are now 
proposed for diminution also as part of tax reform. That sounds like the 
invention of a political perpetual motion machine. 
8 
Hhen you think about the key economic challenges facing the U.S. in the 
1980s -- foreign competition, farm and foreign debts, and huge budget 
deficits the tax reform now being discussed should be dismissed as 
irrelevant. 
Summary 
I will recap briefly. We are basically a strong and wealthy country that 
is not managing its economic affairs too well. We are consuming more than we 
are producing. We are spending more than we are earning. We are borrowing 
more than we are saving. As a result, the economic future is, in a phrase, 
so-so. I see no recession in sight, but economic growth is resuming at a very 
slON pace. Unemployment is leveling off at a high level. On the bright side, 
inflation is staying low for the time being. This is not a period that will go 
down in the economic history books, but it is not nearly as baa as the doom and 
gloom talk we continue to hear. 
